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Abstract
Recently  there  has been  a surge  in international  empirical  whose regional  distribution  is determined  by political
evidence  that national  policymakers allocate resources  agents, usually provide  greater resources  to state
across  regions based on political considerations,  in  governments  that are  politically affiliated  with the
addition  to any normative  considerations of equity and  national  ruling party and  are important in  maximizing
efficiency.  In order to mitigate  these political  the party's  representation  in the national  legislature.  But
compulsions,  several  federations around the world have  the political  effect on statutory  transfers, determined  by
attempted  to create independent  constitutional bodies  an independent  agency with constitutional  authority,  is
that are responsible  for determining  federal transfers  to  strikingly contrary,  with greater resources going to
subnational  jurisdictions. Khemani  tests whether  unaffiliated state governments.  The author argues that
constitutional  rules indeed  make a difference  in curbing  this contrasting evidence indicates  that constitutional
political  influence by  contrasting the impact of political  rules indeed  restrict the extent to which partisan politics
variables on two  types of intergovernmental  transfers  to  can affect resources  available  to subnational
states in the Indian  federation  over a period  of time,  governments.
1972-95.  The pattern of evidence  shows that transfers,
This paper-a product of Public  Services,  Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group  to study
the impact of public spending programs. Copies of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact Hedy Sladovich, room MC3-607, telephone  202-473-7698,  fax  202-522-1154,
email  address  hsladovich@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
econ.worldbank.org.  The author may  be contacted  at skhemani@worldbank.org.  April 2003.  (38 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An ob;ectie of the series s to get the findrigs out quickly, even if  the presentations  are less than fully polished The
papers carry the names of the authors  and should be cited accordingly The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.





1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington,  D.C. 20433
skhemani()worldbank.org.
I am grateful to Stephen Howes, Rafael  Martinez, and Ritva Reinikka for very helpful
comments.  Support from the World Bank's Research Committee is thankfully
acknowledged.I.  Introduction
A recent surge of empirical evidence  shows that variations in intergovernmental
transfers to sub-national jurisdictions within countries cannot be explained by traditional
concerns of equity and efficiency alone, and that political  variables representing  electoral
incentives of public agents are additional and significant determinants (Grossman,  1994;
Pereyra,  1996; Worthington  and Dollery,  1998; Porto and Sanguinetti,  2001). This paper
adds to the literature  by analyzing  and contrasting the political determinants of different
channels of transfers  within one  large developing  country, India, in an effort to explore
how different institutional arrangements may alter the impact of political opportunism.
The Indian federation provides a valuable  laboratory for this purpose because there exist
multiple central government agencies that control different types of grants for which
disaggregated  data is available since  1972.
Normative theories of fiscal federalism postulate that inter-government transfers
should be determined by equity and efficiency considerations, to support local
governments  in providing differentiated  public goods to heterogeneous populations,
while ensuring  an even distribution of basic services across all regions (Musgrave,  1959,
1983;  Oates,  1972; Gramlich,  1977).  A more recent literature focuses on the
inefficiencies  created by local taxation due to inter-jurisdictional tax competition and
mobility,  that creates a valuable role for central taxation and regional  distribution via
grants-in-aid (Inman and Rubinfeld,  1996, provide an excellent review).  However,
empirical  evidence shows that such normative  theories lack explanatory  power because
central decisions about the regional distribution  of resources actually take place within a
political  economy context where national legislators are elected from regional
constituencies, and political bargaining within the legislature determines outcomes
(Weingast,  1979; Shepsle,  1979; Weingast,  Shepsle, and Johnsen,  1981;  Baron and
Ferejohn,  1989; Becker,  1983).
Wright (1974) provided  some of the first indications that political factors were
significant in determining the allocation of federal funds across states in the United
States. In particular, he found a strong positive correlation between New Deal spending
1per capita and electoral votes per capita across states. Inman (1988) argues that the
pattern of distribution of central grants to the states in the United States does not seem
consistent with policies  designed to correct inefficiencies  of a decentralized  tax system,
but rather reflects decisions taken by a universalistic central legislature.  Grossman (1994)
models grants to the U.S. states as being determined by the "political  capital" of state
politicians and interest groups,  and finds that empirical  measures of this-party affiliation
between the national congress and the state legislature, the size of the majority of the
affiliated party in the state legislature,  and the size of the state bureaucracy  and union
membership-are positively correlated with per capita grants. Extending this literature to
federal arrangements  in developing countries,  Porto and Sanguinetti  (2001) find that
Argentine provinces  with greater political representation per capita in the national
legislature receive larger shares of central transfers  compared to more populous and less
represented states.
In recognition of these political compulsions, several federations around the world
have attempted to create politically independent constitutional bodies that are responsible
for determining federal transfers to sub-national jurisdictions.  However, there is no
evidence in the literature that explicitly tests whether these constitutional  rules indeed
make a difference.  For instance, in Australia inter-government transfers are determined
by an independent Commonwealth  Grants Commission, which is supposed to be "free
from political and bureaucratic  bias" (Matthews,  1994, p.  16). Worthington and Dollery
(1998) find evidence that some transfers that are not subject to strict fiscal equalization
formula that govern other fiscal assistance  grants in Australia, are distributed across
states in a manner that is consistent with a Grossman-style story of states with greater
"political capital" receiving greater transfers.  However, they do not provide any evidence
to show whether formula-driven financial  assistance grants, on the other hand, are indeed
impervious to political control, as suggested by the different institutional  framework
within which they are determined.
This paper contrasts the effects of political variables on intergovernmental
transfers determined  under different institutional conditions in India, in an attempt to fill
this gap in the literature.  There are two systematic  channels of general purpose transfers
from the center to the states in India-(i) general revenue sharing and grants in aid of
2state budgets for which the distribution across  states is determined by the Finance
Commission,  an independent body with constitutional authority, whose members consist
of technical  experts appointed  every five years by legal decree; and (ii) grants and loans
to support state development plans managed by the Planning  Commission, a semi-
independent body with no direct constitutional  authority.  The criteria for distribution of
these so-called "plan" transfers across  states is largely determined by a national council
headed by the national political  executive, with representation of state political leaders.
Plan grants  and statutory revenue transfers together make up about 30 percent of state
revenues and 5 percent of state income on average in the sample under study. Plan loans
constitute more than 50 percent of new state borrowings each year on average in the
sample. If political incentives  play a role in determining distribution of resources to state
governments, and if formal institutions external to political agencies serve as a check on
political opportunism,  we would expect very different effects of political variables on
plan transfers from the Planning Corrmission compared to statutory transfers  from the
Finance  Commission.
Using disaggregated  data for intergovernmental  transfers  for 15 major states of
India, over the period 1972-1995,  we find strikingly contrary effects of partisan affiliation
on plan transfers versus statutory transfers  from the Finance Commission.  State
governments that are politically affiliated with the central government receive
significantly greater plan grants and loans, but significantly lower statutory transfers.
Furthermore, plan grants and loans are higher to those affiliated states where the national
ruling party controls a smaller proportion of seats allotted to the state in the national
legislature,  and hence where it has more to gain in order to maximize  representation.
Statutory transfers  are contrastingly lower to these affiliated states whose ruling parties
control a smaller share of the state's representation  in the national legislature. If the two
sets of transfers are pooled, then the partisan effect on plan transfers  dominates, that is,
total general-purpose  transfers from the center are greater when a state government is
politically affiliated with the center.  Affiliated states whose ruling parties control less
than half of the state's seats in the national  legislature receive total transfers that are
greater by 4 to 18 percent of the sample average.
3The partisan effect on general purpose transfers is consistent with a model of
electoral competition between rival political parties where voters vote along party lines
leading to spillovers for a political party between local and national elections. The
equilibrium in this model, if political agents control the decision-making process, is
characterized by greater resource  transfers to politically affiliated state governments.  The
intuition for this is in complete accordance  with the Grossman (1994) hypothesis of
"political capital"  of states determining their grant allocation, and hence these results are
consistent with the evidence  received from other countries. Following Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987), Snyder (1989), and Case (2001), we contrast additional  empirical
predictions for the distribution of transfers under two different political objectives-
whether to maximize representation in the national legislature or the probability of
winning a majority of seats. We find that the pattern of evidence,  specifically, greater
resources targeted to those states where the national ruling party controls a smaller
proportion of seats in the national legislature,  is consistent with the former objective, that
of maximizing the number of seats won in the national  legislature.
Statutory transfers,  on the other hand, over which political control is limited by
constitutional decree,  serve to counter these partisan effects on resources  available to
state governments.  Finance Commission transfers are also affected  by the same political
variables, but in exactly the opposite direction than those predicted by the model of
electoral competition. This is a surprising result, and we argue that it suggests that
constitutional rules indeed act as a check on politically motivated distribution of
resources by the national executive.  The mandate of the Finance Commission is to
provide equalizing transfers,  with greater resources  allocated to disadvantaged  states. If
non-affiliated  states are politically disadvantaged,  and likely to have fewer national
resources directed towards them, whether through intergovernmental  fiscal transfers or
overall national  investments, then it is possible that greater statutory transfers would be
directed to them not because of political motives but because they happen to be the
resource-poor states.
There is a third category of systematic transfers from the center to the states in
India-these  are specific purpose transfers  from central ministries for individual  sector
projects, making up about 6 percent of total revenue receipts of state governments  and 1
4percent of state income on average in the sample under study.'  The use of funds for these
central schemes  is tightly controlled by the central ministries through detailed rules and
conditionalities.  The theoretical  literature on such specific project-based transfers by the
central government focuses the analysis at the level of electoral districts (Cox and
McCubbins,  1986; Lindbeck  and Weibull,  1987; Dixit and Londregan,  1995,  1996,
1998). In testing these models of central allocation of project resources, Levitt and
Snyder (1995),  Case (2001), and Schady (2000), amongst others, find that national
politicians  indeed pursue disaggregated  targeting of individual  districts to serve particular
political objectives.
Although the literature suggests that political effects on such project-specific
transfers are better modeled at the level of the electoral district, we undertake  similar
analysis for these central schemes aggregated at the state level as for the general-purpose
transfers discussed above. Not surprisingly,  at this level of aggregation  we do not find
large nor robust effects of state-level political variables on these transfers. The only
political variable that is a significant determinant of state-level variation in transfers for
central schemes is the number of seats from the state controlled by the central ruling
party in the national legislature.  Greater grants for central schemes are made to those
unaffiliated states where the central political party controls a larger number of seats in the
national legislature.  This evidence is consistent with the literature on such specific-
purpose transfers that are targeted at the level of electoral districts.
The results of this study are consistent with other recent attempts to
econometrically  identify the political determinants  of these different channels of transfers
in India (Rao and Singh, 2000; and Dasgupta, Dhillon, and Dutta, 2001). The broad
conclusion of these studies is that political forces indeed influence all channels of
transfers, but they do not provide robust estimates of the nature of the political influence,
and why it differs across the three types of transfers.  In contrast, the results presented
here are robust to a large range of specifications, and systematically  account for the
differences across the types of transfers.
' Specific purpose transfers for central schemes consist of both grants and loans. Grants for central
schemes are about 16 percent of total central grants (including plan grants and statutory revenue transfers),
while loans for central schemes are about 8 percent of total central  loans.
5In the next section we provide a simple model for the determination of inter-
government transfers by a central agent to guide and interpret the empirical analysis. In
section III we provide some details about the Indian institutions of fiscal federalism, and
the different types of transfers. Section IV describes the data and presents and interprets
the empirical evidence. Section V concludes.
III.  A Simple Model
We first present a basic model derived from Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) that
reflects traditional efficiency and equity considerations  in the determination of inter-
government transfers.  We then augment the model to describe how political
considerations may change the allocation of grants across states, and obtain testable
implications for the effect of political variables on these grants. The model is very simple,
focusing only on inter-government  grants to guide and interpret the econometric  analysis,
and abstracting completely  from any issue of taxation.
Let S denote the number of states in a federal country, where any state s consists
of Ns identical electoral districts, with an exogenous level of income  Y,  and preferences
defined over a local public good  Z, and private consumption  C,:
Us  =U,(C3,Z 3)  (1)
The public good  Z5  is produced in each state by the state government at a cost of
Ps per unit. The local production of this public good is financed by general-purpose
grants G,  provided by the federal government from an exogenous endowment R. Hence,
the budget constraint for the representative electoral district of state s can be written as
follows:
Y  + G=C.  + P *  (2)
The optimization of the utility function in (1)  subject to the constraint in (2) yields
the following indirect utility function for the representative district of state s:
V5  (Y  G, P6)  (3)
6with the partial derivatives of the functions being  Vy  > 0,  Vg  > 0, and  Vp < 0.
The federal government chooses the allocation of grants  G,,G 2.... Gs, to maximize  a
social welfare function that gives equal weight to every citizen:
s
sw= INs(Vs(Y,GsPs)  (4)
s=l
The first order condition that needs  to be satisfied for optimal transfers  Gr and G,
to any two states r and s is given by:
NrVg(Y,,Gr,Pr) = NsVg (Ys,GS,P,)  (5)
which is simply the condition that marginal benefits from additional transfers to
each state have to be equal. Porto and Sanguinetti  (2001)  show that under fairly general
specifications  of utility, we have:
<s  0(6)
that is, transfers are greater to states with lower income.  Under somewhat stricter
conditions, namely,  that the elasticity of substitution for the utility function Us is less than
one, we have:
2 0  (7)
that is, transfers will be greater to those states with higher costs of producing
public goods.
Now we introduce explicit political considerations into the analysis. Political
parties A and B compete for seats to the national and state legislatures from the same
electoral districts. Without loss of generality, let party A be the incumbent party of the
federal government with majority seats in the national legislature. Amongst the S states in
the federation, a subset  SA  have incumbents belonging to the party A, and the remaining
subset SB  have incumbents  belonging to the party B.
7We characterize  the voting behavior of citizens of any state s in accordance  with
models of probabilistic voting where voters evaluate incumbents on the basis of their
performance in office, as compared to a randomly distributed cut-off point. The electoral
districts, of any state s now differ in their realization of this random variable  a,  whose
cumulative distribution function is given by  (o<rs  ).  In addition, there is a general
popularity bias in favor of the national ruling party A, denoted by the parameter ,u. An
individual  district d in a state in  SA  is won by party A in national elections if:
Vd, (Ys,  Gs,n Ps ) + jU  > q(8)
On the other hand, an individual district d in a state in  SB  is won by party A in national
elections if:
V'* (Ys,  Gs,Ps) - 1  < a&  (9)
that is, if the incumbent party B loses the district.
These assumptions about voting behavior and electoral  objectives are admittedly
restrictive-that voters vote for political parties in an identical manner in both local and
national elections; that voters only care about performance  in office rather than policy
platforms announced by competing  candidates, or expected welfare from competing
candidates. The assumption of identical voting along party lines in state and national
elections is not unreasonable in the context of Indian electoral  institutions characterized
as they are by party-based electoral  competition between multiple political parties with
regional power bases.  Butler, Lahiri, and Roy (1995) indicate that political parties are at
the center of Indian democracy, with opinion polls showing that voters are influenced
more by the image of the party rather than the specific candidate.  This party-line voting
seems to be constant across the different levels of elections, both to the national and to
the state legislature.2 Even for other countries, Leyden (1992), Grossman  (1994), and
2 An example from the state of Andhra Pradesh is illustrative in this context. The Congress party lost
control of the state government  in Andhra Pradesh in the 1983  state elections  to a new regional party, the
Telegu Desam. In the next national elections in  1984, even though it won an overwhelming majority of
seats in the national legislature,  the Congress lost most seats from Andhra Pradesh to the Telegu Desam,
despite the latter's novice status in national politics.
8Bungey and others (1991)  agree that party affiliation between the center and the states
can be a critical factor influencing the ability of the federal government to win votes from
that state.
The voting rule assumed above is also consistent with features of electoral  politics
in India-specifically,  that political parties are of the same "type" when it comes to
economic or fiscal policies so that voters in any district take their decision not by
comparing differing policy platforms but by setting a threshold value for re-electing  an
incumbent based on performance in providing public goods while in office. Chhibber
(1995) and Weiner and Field (1974) suggest that there are limited ideological differences
between parties along the lines of economic policy, but rather, party identity is driven by
social, ethnic, and regional differences. Political parties are therefore more concerned
with providing their supporters with access to public resources rather than competing in
the space of economic policy for potential votes. Electoral competition thus revolves
around access to the instruments of government and appropriation of public resources by
different groups (Chhibber,  1995).
This feature of Indian party politics suggests a modification to the common class
of models where elections serve the purpose of removing from office an incumbent that
has performed poorly, the so-called "post-election"  models discussed by Persson and
Tabellini (2000). Usually, in "post-election" models parties are assumed to be identical  so
that voters do not have ideological  preferences  defined over them that are independent of
actual policies.  Here, we assume that some voters have strong ideological preferences
that lead them to cast their vote for individual candidate  identities defined along social,
ethnic, or religious lines, irrespective  of actual performance in office. The higher the
density of these "ideological"  voters the lower is the realization of ad,  that is, the lower
is the threshold that voters in the district can agree upon to determine  the re-election of
their political representative.  Hence, districts with a high concentration of ideological
voting are easier to win even with a lower level of public goods provision because of a
lower threshold value of re-election.
9We make no restrictive assumptions on the distribution of cra  across  states, and
hence on the distribution of ideological voters across  states, assuming that the cumulative
distribution function  (D(or)  is the same for every state. Hence, for state a in subset  SA,
where the incumbent party is political party A, the proportion of seats received by the
national incumbent is given by:
Pa = Na>(FVa(Y,Ga,PJ) +iu)  (10)
On the other hand, for state b in subset SB, where the incumbent party is political
party B, the proportion of seats received by the national incumbent is:
Pb  =  Nb  0-  <D(V  (Yb,  Gb  IPb)  - 8)  *  (11)
From expressions  (9) and (10), we have:
'P  = Na￿(Va(Y  G.,P.) + p)Va > 0
and
aPG  =Nbo(Vb  (y  ,bPb-)b  < 0  (2 aGb  g  (12)
We assume that political parties care only about their electoral objectives. The
national incumbent party A chooses the distribution  G,  to maximize  either the
probability of winning a majority of seats in the legislature, that is, the probability that
the seat share exceeds l/2,  or the total seat share per se. In either case, the conditions in
line (12) imply that the optimal solution to the national  government's problem will be
characterized  by Ga  > Gb, that is, affiliated states should receive greater fiscal transfers
than non-affiliated  states. The solution for  Gb  will be a corner solution given by any
constitutional constraint on the national government regarding  the provision of certain
minimum level of resources to each sub-national jurisdiction.
However, we get very different predictions about the pattern of resource
allocation amongst affiliated  states, depending on the degree to which they are "core"
supporters, if we assume that the electoral objective is to maximize the total number of
10seats in the legislature as opposed to maximizing the probability of winning a majority of
seats. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) contrast these two objectives  and obtain the result
that with the former objective more funds should be allocated to districts where electoral
races are tight, whereas with the latter more weight should be given to "pivotal" districts
or core supporters without whom it would be particularly difficult to win a majority. In a
closely related paper on campaign spending, Snyder (1989) obtains a similar result-a
party that seeks to maximize the probability of winning a majority will spend more  on
"safe" districts, that is, where it has an overall advantage because these are more likely to
be pivotal in obtaining a majority.  These results are also similar to those obtained by Cox
and McCubbins (1986) where risk-averse candidates over-invest in their closest
supporters,  while risk-loving candidates pursue "swing" districts more aggressively,  that
is, districts where voters are more likely to evaluate the candidate in terms of actual
performance in office.
In an empirical test of these competing political objectives,  Case (2001)  finds that
social assistance funding provided to district governments  in Albania was targeted both to
swing districts (where the "distance"  of votes received by the President's party from the
50 percent mark was small), and to politically pivotal districts, as in the core supporters
of the president's party (where the percentage  of votes for the President's party  in the
previous elections was high),  and interprets the evidence as indicative of the president
attempting to maximize the probability of his own re-election.
In our model of allocation of national resources  across states in India it is less
straightforward  to characterize  "core support" and "swing"  states, because of the higher
level of political aggregation than the level of the electoral district, and because
constitutional  rules do not require national parties to win 50 percent of the votes from a
state in order to win the seats allotted to the state in the national  legislature.  Instead, the
country is divided into over 500 districts for elections to the national legislature,  and the
party that wins a majority of districts,  distributed in any manner across the country,irrespective of state borders3, usually gets to form the government.4 Individual districts
are single-member constituencies  won on the basis of a first-past-the-post system, that is
the seat is won by the candidate that gets more votes than any other.  This simple plurality
electoral  law in practice  implies a very tenuous link between the percentage of popular
votes received by a party and the number of seats won in the national legislature.  Butler,
Lahiri, and Roy (1995) indicate that once a party crosses a particular threshold in votes,
around 30 to 35 percent, it can move to a landslide victory in seats by gaining just a few
percentage points in popular support, or conversely, it can lose a majority of seats in the
national legislature by losing a few critical votes.
We now allow the distribution function of ideological voters across states to differ
in order to derive conditions under which a state is a "core supporter"  as opposed to a
"swing"  state, and hence different predictions under different political objectives.  Figure
1 depicts the density function 0 of threshold values a., around the cut-off point,
Vd'(Y5, Gs,PS) + A, in a "core support"  state, while Figure  2 depicts the same for a
"swing" state, within the category of affiliated states. A "core support" state is
characterized  as one where there is a higher proportion of districts with threshold values
below the cut-off level, both because of the shape of the density function around the cut-
off point and because of greater popularity of the national party, that is, a higher value of
,u. Hence, the national ruling party is likely to win a greater proportion of districts from a
"core support"  state. On the other hand, in a "swing" state, a higher proportion of districts
have threshold values above the cut-off point, both because of the shape of the density
function around the cut-off point and a lower value of p. Hence, the national ruling party
is likely to win a smaller proportion of seats from a "swing" state.
An additional unit of grants at the cut-off point gains a smaller number of
additional  seats for the national party in a "core support" state as opposed to a "swing"
3 Each national electoral district is wholly contained within some state's borders.  States differ in the
number of districts for the national legislature that is allotted to them, that is denoted by Ns  in the model
above.
4 In case of a clear majority,  as in more than 50 percent of the seats, the party is always invited by the
President (the constitutional  head) to form the government. However,  in recent years no single party has
won even close to 50 percent of the seats,  in which case coalitions are built across party lines that need to
face a confidence vote  in Parliament in order to form the government.
12state, because of the downward slope of the density function around the cut-off point in
the former and the upward slope in the latter. This is shown by the shaded area under the
density function when the cut-off point moves to the right due to additional grants. Yet,
the total number of seats from "core  support" states, that is the area under the density
function to the left of the cut-off point, may be close enough to 50 percent so that these
are "pivotal" for the national party if its objective is to gain a majority in the national
legislature.  That is, without these states, the national party would not be able to win a
majority. Hence, if the objective of the national  party is to win a majority it should
allocate greater resources to "core support" states rather than to "swing" states.
Empirically, this implies that not only should the national party allocate more resources
to affiliated states, but within affiliated states particularly  target those states where it
controls a larger proportion of seats in the national legislature. The reverse is true if the
objective  is to maximize the number of seats won in the national legislature-that  is, to
maximize partisan representation the national party should target resources to those
affiliated  states where an additional unit of grants gains a greater number of seats at the
margin, that is, states where it controls a smaller number of seats in the national
legislature.
The above political economy framework forms the basis of the empirical
specification  for this analysis which is estimated for each type of transfers described
below, in order to test not only whether transfers are manipulated for political purposes,
but additionally,  what the underlying political objectives are,  and whether constitutional
rules provide a check on political opportunism.
III.  Institutions of Fiscal Federalism and Inter-government Transfers in India
The constitutional  assignment of expenditure responsibilities  and revenue
authority between the central and the state governments  in India is inherently  imbalanced
to give the central  government a role in regional redistribution.5 Provision of public
services is substantially  decentralized to state governments,  which undertake about 60
5 Detailed analysis of fiscal federalism  and inter-government  transfers  in India, with exhaustive
references,  can be found in Rao and Chelliah (1991)  and Rao and Singh (2000, 2001).
13percent of total spending. Central grants to state governments  constitute about 38 percent
of state revenues, and 4.7 percent of the national  GDP (Rao and Singh, 2000). There are
three channels of systematic central transfers in support of state budgetsX-(i) formula-
driven general revenue sharing and statutory grants;  (ii) formula-driven  general purpose
transfers to support state development plans; and (iii) discretionary transfers from central
ministries for specified sector projects.  A summary description of these transfers is
provided in Table  1.
Bulk of the central transfers to state governments  consist of general revenue
sharing of the proceeds of certain centrally  levied and administered taxes determined in
the Constitution.  The shares of the center and the states and the horizontal distribution
across states is decided by the Finance Commission, a statutory body made up of
technical experts appointed by the President of India every five years.  In addition to tax
devolution, the Finance Commission also provides for grants-in-aid that are popularly
known as "gap-filling"  transfers as they are designed to cover the discrepancy between
projected expenditures  and revenues of states. Tax devolution by the Finance
Commission accounted for 58 percent and statutory grants for 3 percent of total revenue
transfers to states in 1998, bringing the total share of statutory transfers  in revenue
transfers to 61 percent (Rao and Singh, 2000). The share of statutory transfers in the
sample of major states studied here is even greater, at 64 percent on average.
Although the Constitution only provides  for one statutory body to determine
transfers to the states, another central agency that has been the architect of planned
economic development in India, the Planning Commission, also makes transfers to states
for so-called "plan" expenditures determined  within state government budgets. The
distribution formula for Planning Commission transfers is determined by the National
Development Council which is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes all central
cabinet ministers, Chief Ministers of states, and the members of the Planning
Commission.  The grant component of total plan assistance is approximately  30 percent,
with the remaining 70 percent devolved to the states as loans. Plan grants to all states
constituted about 22 percent of total revenue transfers in  1998 (Rao and Singh, 2000). For
the sample of major states studied here, plan grants constitute a lower proportion,  15
14percent,  on average of revenue  transfers. Plan loans constitute more than 50 percent of
total state borrowings on average in the sample.
In addition to the general purpose transfers determined by the Finance
Commission and Planning Commission, individual central ministries also devolve funds
to states for specific projects either wholly financed by the center-central plan schemes
and sector projects-or requiring counterpart funds from states-centrally sponsored
schemes.  These specific purpose transfers, while determined at the discretion of central
ministries, are generally monitored by the Planning Commission,  and constituted about
15 percent of total central transfers in 1998  (Rao and Singh, 2000).
The transfers determined by the Finance Commission and Planning Commission
are general purpose transfers that increase the budget resources available to state
governments to allocate at their discretion. We test whether the predictions of the model
for the determination of G, holds for these transfers. The institutional determinants of
statutory transfers by the Finance Commission versus plan transfers by the Planning
Commission would lead us to expect that the effect of political opportunism is more
pronounced  for the latter since these are determined through the direct participation of the
executive branch of the federal government.  Statutory transfers,  on the other hand, are
determined by a Commission whose appointment cycle is typically not congruent with
the electoral  cycle, and hence there is greater likelihood of political independence.6
The distribution of both statutory and plan transfers  across states is supposed to be
formula-driven.  Successive Finance  Commissions have put different weights on the
criteria of derivation, population, per capita state domestic product,  and a variety of
measures for relative poverty and "backwardness" of states. Plan transfers have been
devolved according to different versions of the Gadgil formula established  in 1969,
which puts the greatest weight on state population,  but has also reflected similar concerns
for redistribution to resource-poor states  as the Finance Commission formulae.
6 However,  Rao and Singh (2000) provide anecdotal  evidence to suggest that the members of the
Finance Commission have close bureaucratic ties with the central executive, and are often transferred
midway through their tenure on the Commission to coveted positions  in the central administration.
15The discretionary transfers for central schemes are specific purpose transfers for
projects over which the central government has considerable  control.  Spending on these
programs is heavily circumscribed by central government dictates, and many scholars of
Indian fiscal federalism have suggested that these rules are often resented by state
governments as central government intrusion into state decision-making  (Rao and
Chelliah,  1991).  Rao and Singh (2000) describe that there are about 250 central schemes
with detailed conditionalities such as requirements  on staffing patterns or selection of
beneficiaries that the central government imposes on the use of these funds. These
schemes are implemented at the district level, and it is therefore likely that political
targeting of these schemes occurs at a more disaggregated level than that of the state.
RV.  Data and Empirical Evidence
Data
Disaggregated  data on the three different types of transfers-statutory  transfers,
plan grants, and central schemes-is reported in consistent categories since  1972 in the
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, a quarterly publication of the central bank of India with
annual issues on details of finances of state governments.7 The data on intergovernmental
transfers is combined with political and economic data available from other sources for
15 major states of India over the period 1972-1995.  The political data is compiled from
Butler, Lahiri, and Roy (1995). State demographic  and economic characteristics,  and a
state-level price index to convert all variables  into real terms are available from a data set
put together at the World Bank, which is described in detail in Ozler and others (1996).
Table 2 provides summary statistics  for each of the variables included in the analysis.
These 15  states of India account for 95 percent of the total population.  India
consists of 26 states at present but many of the smaller ones have been created recently.
However,  1  1 of the  15 states under study have existed since the organization of the
federation in  1956. An additional two, were created for linguistic reasons out of a single
large state-Maharashtra and Gujarat-in  1960; and two in 1966-Punjab and
7I am grateful to Tim Besley of the London School  of Economics and to Bhaskar Naidu of the World
Bank's South Asia regional divison for providing me with some of this data that had already been compiled
in their research groups.
16Haryana-also for ethnic and linguistic reasons.  Hence, in order to avoid issues of
endogenous  state boundaries,  and of special transfers to smaller states, we focus only on
the  15 major states that have existed from the early days of the federation. 8
Empirical  Specification
As discussed above, general purpose transfers  from the center to the states in
India are formula-driven.  State population and income are the main variables  entering the
distribution formulae determined by successive  generations of the Finance Commission
and Planning Commission.  For the distribution across states of centrally collected taxes
shared with the states, successive  Finance Commissions have put different weights on the
criteria of population, inverse of per capita income, and a variety of measures for relative
poverty and "backwardness"  of states (such as "distance" of the poorest  state from the
richest), together amounting to 80-90 percent of the weight, while the tax contribution of
individual states makes up the remaining  10-20 percent (Datt and Sundharam,  1998). For
grants, the Finance Commissions have used discretion in assessing relative need and
urgency of states for additional fiscal resources,  guided by the general objective of
providing greater assistance to resource  disadvantaged states.
Planning Commissions have used versions of the Gadgil formula since  1969
which also puts different weights  on a similar set of variables, primarily population and
the inverse of income. This suggests that income, population, and state fixed effects
(capturing the relative position of states along the dimension of economic development)
should explain a great deal of the variation in these central  transfers across states.  In
addition, variation over time may be explained by year-specific  shocks to the center's
available resources for regional distribution, and hence common to all states. Hence, the
econometric  specification implied by a strict model of formula-driven transfers would be
as follows:
G,  =  r.GZ,t + aGi  + gG,  + gGi  (13)
8  These  15 states are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar,  Gujarat, Haryana, Kamataka,  Kerala,  Madhya
Pradesh,  Maharashtra,  Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu,  Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal.  A sixteenth
major state, Jammu and Kashmir,  has been  excluded because of the political uncertainties  in the region that
continue to this day.
17where G,, are the general purpose transfers consisting of statutory transfers and plan
grants and loans; Z,1, is a vector of state economic characteristics  that dominate the
distribution formulae,  namely, per capita state income and total population;  a, represents
state-level fixed effects; and  ,, are year effects included to control for various shocks to
the national economy and fiscal resources in any given year.9
However, if political considerations  influence the center's distribution of
resources across states, as there is evidence  for in other federations  in both the developed
and developing world, then specification (13) would need to be appropriately  augmented
with political variables.  The political  economy model presented  in Section II suggests the
following empirical  specification for the federal government's distribution of general
purpose transfers to the states:
G,, = IJAFFILIA TION,1 + yAFFIL *SEA TS,,  + ip (I-AFFIL) *SEA  TS,,
+ iGZ,t + a',  +  +  gC,,  (14)
where AFFILIATION, 1 is an indicator of political affiliation that equals  1 when the
incumbent party in state i at time t belongs to the same party as that governing at the
center at time t, and 0 otherwise; the next two variables  are the interaction of political
affiliation with the proportion of seats (allotted to the state) controlled by the national
ruling party in the national legislature-SEATS,t. The fixed-effects  specification implies
that, A,  the coefficient on political affiliation,  is identified from variation within  a state
from its own average transfer receipts when it is affiliated and not affiliated with the
center.
Condition (12)  suggests that a federal government that uses fiscal instruments for
resource transfer to state governments to optimize its electcral objectives will choose a
distribution such that:
)6>0
9  The distribution formulae  for both statutory transfers  and plan transfers  have also given weight to
measures of revenue potential of states. We control  for this through the inclusion  of state income and state
fixed effects, since revenue  potential of states is  arguably invariant over time and largely determined by
state income  In  recent years,  outside of the sample under study, some weight is being placed on measures
of state tax efforts to provide incentives  for additional own revenue mobilization.
18Furthermore,  controlling for political  affiliation, we expect that if the objective of
political parties is to maximize the number of seats in the national legislature,  as opposed
to the probability of winning a majority,  then the coefficient on the interaction of
affiliation with the proportion of seats controlled by the national ruling party should be
negative:
<  0
That is, greater resources  should be targeted to those affiliated states where the national
ruling party controls a smaller proportion of seats in the national  legislature.
However, if the constitutional  rules determining the allocation of statutory
transfers  and the institutions circumscribing  the determination of plan grants are indeed
impervious to political pressure, we would expect both ,6and yto be statistically
insignificant.
The affiliation indicator is coded as equal to  1 if we are able to establish strict
matching in party identity between the state and central government, that is, we ignore
the role of political affiliation between loosely knit coalitions.  This is important for the
empirical  specification to be consistent with the model outlined in Section II because the
results are driven by the assumption that voters are able to clearly distinguish between
different political parties, and the rewards  for the central government from state fiscal
policies derive  immediately from the rewards to the state political party.
Endogeneity of the affiliation indicator and the proportion of seats controlled by
the national ruling party in the legislature may be a cause for concern in specification
(13), as greater central transfers to a state may influence voter perceptions  and good-will
and lead to increasing votes for the national political party and hence to the election of a
state government that is politically affiliated with the center.  We address this by using the
following feature of electoral  and fiscal institutions in India:  that political  variables are
invariant between elections and updated at each election,  and as elections are generally
scheduled to take place immediately at the end or very beginning of a fiscal year, the
resulting values of the political variables  applicable to fiscal year t in state i, over which
the fiscal variable G,t is measured, may be regarded as pre-determined  with respect to the
19determination of G,, .10 If, on the other hand, knowing this schedule the central agencies
design transfers to be disbursed precisely around election times, then the coefficient ,Pon
the affiliation indicator would in fact be picking-up the effect of the timing of elections.  It
is straight forward to check for this by including various indicators of the state election
cycle, which we undertake and report the results below.
It may also be argued that unobserved voter tastes and other shocks that affect
both the political process of determining affiliation of the state  government as well as
inter-government fiscal transfers  are driving the correlation between the affiliation
indicator and transfers.  We argue that this effect of unobserved voter tastes and other
shocks are attenuated by the inclusion of state and year fixed effects. As discussed in
Section II, the literature on electoral  competition in India has emphasized that differences
between Indian political parties are not linked to differences  in voter taste for fiscal
policy, but rather voter taste for party identity along social and ethnic lines which are
either region-specific  and largely invariant over time, or affected by time-specific shocks.
Results
The estimates of the simple specification in (13) are presented in Table 3 for each
type of general purpose transfer. About 61 percent of the variation in total plan transfers
and 81  percent of the variation in statutory transfers is explained by this specification
based on the formulae  governing the distribution of transfers. When no state fixed effects
are included, statutory transfers are negatively correlated with state income, thereby
affirming the role of the Finance Commission in providing greater assistance to
disadvantaged  states. Total plan transfers,  on the other hand are not significantly
correlated with income-while plan grants are progressive, as are statutory grants, per
capita plan loans to states are greater when state income is higher.
'O  The fiscal year in India runs from April I to March 31, which  is the period over which annual fiscal
variables are measured.  Hence transfers received by any state in year 1988,  for example, relate to receipts
between April  1988 and March  1989. Most elections in India (both to the state and national legislatures)
have occurred between the months of January-April.  Therefore,  the political variables in year 1988 are
derived from elections  that occurred between January and April 1988,  and hence predetermined  with
respect to the decisions over fiscal transfers.
20When state fixed effects  are included much of the redistributive content of central
transfers  is reduced to some states receiving  systematically greater transfers than others-
Assam, Orissa, and Kerala receive significantly greater statutory transfers than the
average of the other states, while Assam, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh receive significantly
greater plan transfers.. The result for Assam is not surprising, since it is the only state in
the sample of 15 major states studied here that is explicitly assigned to the category of
"Cspecial"  states that receive greater central assistance."1 Orissa has consistently been the
poorest state of India,  which explains why greater  statutory transfers are directed towards
it.  Kerala and Uttar Pradesh are also states with poverty rates generally above the country
average. Punjab, on the other hand, is one of the richest states, but perhaps  receives
greater plan transfers owing to its economic importance  as an agricultural  state during the
Green Revolution, or to its political importance during a secessionist movement in the
1  980s. In general, the results in Table 3 show that statutory transfers  are more progressive
in redistribution across states, and have a greater percentage of their variation across
states and over time explained  by the simple economic  criteria underlying their
distribution formula, than is the case for total plan transfers.
Table 4 reports the results of augmenting the simple model with the inclusion of
political variables.  We find that plan grants are directed towards affiliated states as the
model predicts, and furthermore towards those affiliated states that contribute a smaller
share of the total number of state legislators in the national assembly for the national
ruling party.  Those affiliated states from which only half of the national legislators
belong to the national ruling party receive about  10 percent greater plan transfers than
states with greater proportion of seats in the national legislature  belonging to the national
ruling party.  States with an even lower proportion, say only a quarter of the seats
belonging to the national ruling party, receive even greater transfers by about 30 percent
of the sample average.  These results are consistent with the political economy model
outlined in Section II-not only do we find evidence  that transfer instruments are
affected by political  objectives, but the pattern of evidence  also identifies the particular
" The special  category states are the smaller states, presumably with greater fiscal disadvantages,  and
the north eastern  states with tribal  populations that are both politically  important (due to continuing
secessionist movements) and economically  needy.
21form of the political objective, that of maximizing the number of seats in the national
legislature. Consistent with this objective,  greater transfers are directed towards those
states where the national ruling party has more seats to gain, rather than to the core
support states where  it already controls a high proportion of seats to the national
legislature.
On the other hand, statutory transfers to politically affiliated states controlling half
the proportion of seats in the national  legislature are 16 percent lower than the sample
average, and hence directly contradictory to the predictions of a model of political
opportunism.  This is a surprising result, and we argue below that it indicates not only that
constitutional rules are effective in curbing political manipulation, but that they may
actually attenuate the impact of political opportunism on total resources available to
states. Inclusion of the political variables explains an additional 4 percent of the variation
in plan transfers, but only an additional  1 percent of the variation in statutory transfers.
We probe the interpretation of the surprising results for the impact of political
affiliation on statutory transfers a little further. What if the results for statutory transfers
are driven by political  affiliation of states with powerful political parties that have
temporarily lost control of the national  legislature,  and hence register as non-affiliated for
some years? We test for this by estimating whether Congress-controlled  states receive the
bulk of transfers,  even after accounting for political affiliation,  since the Congress party
has been, by far, the historically  dominant party in India. We find no effect of Congress
states on the distribution of statutory transfers,  and the coefficient for affiliation remains
unchanged even after including the indicator variable for Congress states.
Another alternate explanation may be that the political economy model is
misspecified,  with the "right" model being that the state affiliation  of individual  members
of the Finance Commission matters for statutory transfers. However,  there is no reason
for the individual affiliations of the members to be systematically correlated  with the
political affiliation between the center and the individual states, especially after we've
already controlled for state fixed effects, which may have created such systematic
correlation due to the existence of particular states that have been historically non-
affiliated with the center and also happen to be states with a tradition of producing
22leading national policy-makers.  Hence, even if the individual affiliation of Finance
Commission members matters, it still does not explain the effect of center-state political
affiliation estimated here.
Yet another  alternate view may be that instead of a model of central political
opportunism,  the model explaining the distribution of transfers is that of a bargaining
game between the center and the states (as is the view of Riker,  1975, and the basis of
Rao and Singh's, 2000, empirical  testing). If statutory transfers were determined by a
process of non-cooperative bargaining, then it may result in greater transfers to non-
affiliated states. Yet, the rest of the evidence is contradictory to such a story of Rikerian
bargaining,  a logical extension of which would be to expect non-affiliated  states with a
greater share of seats to receive greater transfers;  or all states with a greater share of seats
to be so favored.  It therefore  does not seem possible to explain the effect of political
affiliation on statutory transfers by a model of explicit political motivation without
coming into conflict with the evidence  for plan transfers,  and the evidence on lower
transfers to states where the national ruling party controls a larger proportion of seats.
We therefore conclude that the only interpretation consistent with the pattern of
results for both types of general purpose transfers is that while the one that is more
amenable  to control by political agents, the plan transfers,  is indeed targeted to politically
important states as predicted by a specific political  economy model of central resource
distribution, the other that is determined by apolitical agents with constitutional  authority,
the statutory transfers, actually  serves as a check on political opportunism by increasing
resources available at the margin to politically disadvantaged states. This pattern of
evidence  is also difficult to reconcile with models of universalistic  legislatures  which
would predict that all states, both affiliated and unaffiliated, tend to get greater transfers
when they have more legislators from the central ruling party.
Table 5 reports the total  effect of political affiliation on the sum of both these
general purpose transfers.  The political effect on plan transfers dominates the overall
results, with total general purpose transfers  to politically important affiliated states (that
is, those with a lower proportion of seats in the national legislature controlled by the
national  ruling party) being significantly greater than to other states. For affiliated states
23with half or less than half the state's seats in the national legislature controlled by the
ruling party, total general purpose fiscal transfers are higher by between 4 and 18 percent
of the sample average.
This pattern of evidence is robust to several other political explanations  involving
other political variables,  such as the state election cycle, an indicator for the presence of a
coalition govermment at the state level, and an interaction of affiliation after 1990 when
coalition politics emerged in the national legislature  and non-cooperative  bargaining
between the center and regional parties in the states becamne more likely. Table 6 shows
the results with the inclusion of these variables.  The previous results for the impact of
political affiliation is unchanged. The state election cycle and the post-1990 emergence of
national coalition politics have no significant effect on transfers. However,  one additional
political effect emerges-when a state is ruled by a coalition of political parties it tends to
receive lower statutory transfers.
Reverse causation,  that is, that higher central transfers increase  state support for
the central ruling party leading to greater probability of political affiliation and a higher
proportion of seats for the national ruling party, and correlation with unobserved  voter
tastes does not seem defensible on several counts. First, the affiliation effect persists even
after controlling for the timing of state elections, which is one of the mechanisms  by
which the effect would run in the opposite direction;  second, because the suggested
positive sign on the coefficient for affiliation does not apply for the largest group of
central transfers-the statutory transfers; and third, the correlation of transfers  with the
proportion of seats for the national ruling party is exactly opposite in sign to what would
be predicted by this alternate story of endogeneity of the political variables.
Table 7 reports the results for the specific purpose transfers to state governments
for central schemes executed at the district level.  The political model employed here does
not perform well in explaining the variation in these transfers  for central schemes.  One
reason for this could be that central schemes are decided at the constituency level rather
than the state level, and political variation across electoral districts really drives
allocation through these schemes. If this district level political variation cannot be
effectively aggregated to the state level, as may be the case in India due to the disconnect
24between votes won in a district and seats won in the state or national legislature  (as
discussed in Butler, Lahiri,  and Roy,  1995), then a state-level model to explain the
political economy of central schemes will not be effective.
After testing multiple specifications, only a very restricted political variable was
found to be statistically significant-non-affiliated  states with a higher share of central
ruling party legislators in the national  assembly receive greater grants for central
schemes. Non-affiliated states with more than half the national legislators  belonging to
the national ruling party receive between  12 and 25 percent greater  grants for central
schemes.  The political effect on transfers for central schemes seems to be consistent with
the anecdotal  evidence available in the literature on Indian fiscal federalism (Rao and
Chelliah,  1991; Rao and Singh, 2000),  as discussed  earlier, that central  schemes  are
amenable to greater control by the national  executive, and implemented  at the level of
electoral districts.  Hence, the state-level effect of greater  grants to non-affiliated states
with a larger proportion of national  ruling party legislators may be the result of
aggregating  up from the targeting of affiliated electoral districts, which is particularly
important in non-affiliated  states where the other fiscal instruments of general purpose
transfers cannot be used to gain seats to the national legislature. Future research on this
issue with district level data would be valuable for a better understanding of political
incentives behind public spending policies in India.
V.  Conclusion
Recently there has been a surge in empirical  evidence that national politicians
make decisions of regional resource allocation based upon the optimization of their
electoral objectives,  in addition to any normative considerations of equity and efficiency.
In recognition of these political compulsions,  several federations  around the world have
attempted to create independent constitutional  bodies that are responsible for determining
federal transfers to sub-national jurisdictions.  This study attempts to test whether political
factors are significant in determining  intergovernmental  fiscal transfers in India,  and to
further identify the particular form of the political objective function. We also test
whether constitutional  rules circumscribing political discretion over transfer instruments
25indeed make a difference,  by contrasting the impact of political variables on different
types of inter-government  transfers to states in the Indian federation.
The empirical results indicate that when national political agents have decision-
making authority over the distribution of resources across  states, then the distribution of
intergovernmental  transfers  across states over time is influenced by political
considerations. Furthermore, the pattern of evidence is consistent with a particular
political objective, that of obtaining the maximum number of seats in the national
legislature, as opposed to maximizing the probability of winning a majority. National
political parties target greater resources to those states where they have more seats to gain
in the national legislature,  rather than to states that are their core support bases, and hence
pivotal for winning a majority.
The effect of partisan politics on transfers that are detennined under strict
constitutional authority is strikingly contrary to the partisan  effect on other transfers  that
are subject to less stringent rules. While plan transfers to politically affiliated states,
whose distribution formula is determined by a national council  with representation  of the
national political executive,  are 10 percent higher than the sample average, statutory
transfers to politically affiliated states, whose distribution formula is determined by a
constitutional body whose members have no official political affiliation,  are  13 percent
lower than the sample average. This evidence  suggests that while more discretionary
transfers are indeed amenable to serve political objectives, the rules-based transfers may
in fact be used by statutory bodies to counteract partisan effects  on resources available  to
state governments.
The analysis undertaken here therefore shows that constitutional rules
determining intergovernmental  transfers indeed make a difference for the allocation
outcome. Furthermore,  the contrast between the different types of transfers suggests that
the difference is due to the effect of constitutional rules on the general decision-making
process rather than the difference between formula-driven versus discretionary transfers.
Although both statutory transfers and plan grants are formula-driven,  we find a partisan
effect on each of them albeit in meaningfully opposite directions. These findings
highlight the significance  of the political incentive environment  within which policy
26decisions are made, and the limitations of technical formulae in neutralizing or blocking
the impact of political imperatives.
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31TabRe 1
Intergovernmental Transfers  iDE lndia
Type  Decision-making  Authority  Share in Total
for lDlistribuntion Criteria  CentraR
[ Transfers'
Statutoiry Revenue  General  Statutory body appointed every 5  64%
Transfers
(Tax sharing + grants)  purpose  years  (of grants)
National council chaired by the  15% lPll&m Transfers
(Ratio of grants to loans  General  prime minster, and including  (of grants)
instituted tO be  purpose  central cabinet ministers and state  51%
instituted to b  chief ministers  (of central  loans) approximtely 30:70 )
Central  Schemes  16%
(No fixed ratio of grants  Spe  Individual central ministries  (of grants)
to loas)  purpose
ln(of central  loans)
a. Numbers are the sample average for 15 major states over the period  1972-1995.  The transfer numbers do
not add up to 100% because some central  grants and loans are non-systematic,  for emergency and
miscellaneous  purposes. A significant portion (31%) of loans to a state classified as coming from the center
are from small savings originating in the state.
32Table 2
Summary Statisticsa
Variable  No. of Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.
Finance Commission Transfers  352  173.32  64.80
Planning Commission Grants  351  45.85  45.65
Planning Cormission Loans  345  80.72  74.18
Grants for Central Schemes  351  46.04  27.10
Loans for Central Schemes  345  4.88  8.39
Real  state domestic product  360  4803.73  1807.98
Total population (in thousands)  360  47396.79  28163.28
Political affiliation  360  0.62  0.49
(=1  if center and state govt. belong to
same political party)
Affiliation  * Proportion of seats held by  360  0.47  0.41
representatives of the national rulinM
(1- Affiliation) * Proportion of seats  360  0.15  0.27
held by the representatives of the
national ruling party
Coalition government  360  0.16  0.37
(=1  if state executive  consists of a
coalition govt.)
State election year  360  0.21  0.41
(= 1 in the year preceding a state
election)
a.  Fiscal variables and state domestic product are in per capita  1992 rupees
b.  Proportion of the total seats allotted to the state in the national  legislature
33Table 3
EcomoiunicI/Fornmnua  ]Determixnazmts of llntergovermumenntal  Tiransfers
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Statutory Tlransfers  Plan  Giranits  Tota  Pllan Transfers
(Loanas + Grants)
Real state  -0.02  -0.004  -0.01  -0.01  0.003  0.01
income per  (-10.36)  (-1.16)  (-4.62)  (2.14)  (0.64)  (1.51)
capita
Total  -0.0002  0.0005  -0.0004  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002
population  (-2.79)  (1.29)  (-3.65)  (-1.19)  (-4.76)  (-1.58)
Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
State fixed  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes
effects
N=352  N=352  N=351  N=351  N=345  N=345
Rsq=0.68  Rsq=0.81  Rsq=0.31  Rsq=0.63  Rsq=0.31  Rsq=0.61
Note: OLS regressions with robust standard errors; Dependent variables and state income
are in per capita 1992 rupees.
34Table 4
Effect of Partisan Politics on Intergovernmental Transfers
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Total Plan Transfers  Statutory Transfers
Political affiliation  64.74  -41.84
(=1 if center and state govts. belong  (2.51)  (-3.69)
to the same political party)
Affiliation  * Proportion of seats  -103.25  25.66
controlled by national ruling party  (-3.21)  (2.23)
(1- Affiliation)  * Proportion of seats  -40.88  -11.32
controlled by national ruling party  (-2.39)  (-1.03)
0.01  -0.003
Real  state income per capita  (1.65)  (-0.94)
-0.002  0.00004
Total population  (-2.02)  (0.10)
F-statistic for Ho: effect of seats is  3.80  5.84
equal for affiliated and non-  (p-value = 0.05)  (p-value = 0.02)
affiliated states
N=345  N=352
R-sq = 0.65  R-sq = 0.82
Note.  State fixed effects and year effects included;  OLS regressions with robust standard
errors; Dependent variables and state income are in per capita 1992 rupees
35Table 5
Effect of Partisan  Politics on lintergovern mental Transfers
(t-statistic in  arenthesis)
Variable
Total Tlransfers
(Statutory T1ransfers + Plan Transfers)
56.29
Political affiliation  (2.13)
Affiliation  *  Proportion of seats controlled  -88.49
by national ruling party  _  _2_91_
0.004
Real state income per capita  (0.60)
-0.001
Total population  (-1.33)
N = 345
R-sq = 0.79
Note: State fixed effects  and year effects included;  OLS regressions  with robust standard
errors; Dependent variables and state income are in per capita 1992 rupees
36Table 6
Effect of Other Political Variables on Intergovernmental Transfers
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Total Plan Transfers  Statutory Transfers
Political affiliation  84.21  -39.48
(=1 if center and state govts. belong to  (2.76)  (-3.07)
the same political party)
. . - . ~~~~~~~-108.58  20.58
Affiliation  * Proportion of seats  -13.225  21.79
controlled by national ruling party  (-  (1.79)
-38.93  -4.94
(1- Affiliation)  * Proportion of seats  (-2.26)  (-0.44)
controlled by national ruling party
Coalition government  7.94  -18.65
(=1 if state executive consists of a  (0.57)  (-2.32)
coalition govt.)
State election year  -10.93  5.39
(=1  in the year preceding  a state  (-1.29)  (1.30)
election)
32.75  -1.75
(1- Affiliation)  * Yearsl990-1995  (1.63)  (-0.16)
0.01  -0.003
Real state income per capita  (1.65)  (-0.99)
-0.002  0.0001
Total population  (-2.02)  (0.36)
N = 345  N=352
R-sq = 0.65  R-sq = 0.83
Note: State fixed effects and year effects included; OLS regressions  with robust standard
errors; Dependent variables and state income are in per capita  1992 rupees
37Table 7
Effect of Partisan Polities on Specifie-Puirpose  Grants
(t-statistic in  arenthesis)
Variable  Grants for Central Schemes
Political affiliation  3.38
(=1 if center and state govts. belong to the  (0.70)
same political party)
Affiliation  * Proportion of seats controlled  -0.93
by national ruling party  (-  )
(I - Affiliation)  * Proportion of seats  11.41
controlled by national ruling party  (2.64)
-0.004
Real state income per capita  (-1.88)
-0.0002
Total population  (-0.91)
N=351
R-sq = 0.71
Note: State fixed effects  and year effects included; OLS regressions  with robust standard
errors; Dependent variables and state income are in per capita  1992 rupees
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